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Hoover and Historians
Revisionism Since 1980
A Review Essay by PATRICK G. O'BRIEN
A S S I D U O U S L Y "BASHED" by progressive historians, Herbert
Hoover suffered a generation of infamy as a callous and inept reaction-
ary. Writing from widely varied viewpoints, revisionists convincingly
resurrected the "Chief" from progressive ignominy between the late
1950s and about 1980.' Progressive and revisionist versions of Hoover
had slight resemblance. Archetypal progressive historian Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., for example, claimed to be unaware that Hoover had
redeeming qualities in The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933 (Boston:
Houghton Miff lin, 1957). Revisionists, however, revealed the reform
efforts, decent impulses, and broad vision of the less than perfect
"Chief," and some even certified that he was a New Dealer.
Immutable historical interpretation is as common as a vacuum in
nature, so it is not surprising that many of the impressions of Hoover in
historical writing since 1980 diverge from those during the apogee of
revisionism. Although Hoover literature since the 1950s cannot be
neatly divided into inviolate phases, a perceivable transition between
"initial" and "derivative" revisionism occurred early in this decade.
Writing after 1980 can largely be construed as derivative in the sense
that it has generously and explicably appropriated many ideas and
concepts of earlier revisionism. Dissimilarity between the phases is,
however, as evident as continuity. Although a portion of later writing
may not equal the verve of initial revisionism, it is emphatically not
without significant qualities. Later writing has encompassed new top-
ics, applied twists to old ones, and, even added facets to the already
complex and enigmatic "Chief." One of the biggest differences in revi-
sionism before and after 1980 is that the latter often has a harsher tone
and less flattering assessments of Hoover.
Herbert Hoover Reassessed: Essays Commemorating the Fiftieth An-
niversary of the Inauguration of Our Thirty-First President (Washington:
GPO, 1981) may represent the high point and fruition of initial revi-
1. See Patrick G. O'Brien and Philip T. Rosen, "Hoover and the Histori-
ans: The Resurrection of a President," Annfl/so/Zowa 46 (1981), 25-42,83-99.
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sionism. A sprawling anthology of twenty-nine essays with pro-
nounced unevenness, the contributors largely restate their earlier and
complimentary interpretations of the "Chief." Originality is neither ex-
pected nor particularly evident in this commemorative volume, but it is
a useful summary and gauge of initial revisionist interpretations and
sentiments.
N O T ALL BOOKS afterward, of course, have been inordinately nega-
tive toward Hoover, and that is especially the case with one that closed
a huge biographical gap. Any neglect and superficiality with regard to
Hoover's life and career before entry into public service is rectified in
George H. Nash, The Life of Herbert Hoover: The Engineer, 1874-1914
(New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1983). This exemplary first
book in a projected multivolume biography is exhaustively researched,
cogently written, and jammed with keen analysis. Although earlier re-
visionist influences are apparent, Nash's analysis is singular.
A terse review of Hoover's family history and childhood has in-
cisive commentary on his personality, particularly as a consequence
of his parents' deaths and unsatisfactory surrogates. Described in un-
equivocal terms is the Stanford influence on Hoover, and his invio-
late attachment to the institution that substituted as family and
home, provided his future wife, and prepared him for a career. The
last is the book's emphasis, and it is absorbing biography, as well as
economic, business, and social history, often on a global scale. Com-
pulsively ambitious, calculating and astute, and inhumanly stub-
born, Hoover's business failures and career frustrations were mini-
mal when compared with his phenomenal success. Not above
shrewd dealing and self-aggrandizement, he was fundamentally
principled and decent, which made him somewhat conspicuous in
mining and financial circles.
Nash is persuasive on the proposition that Hoover's later policies
reflected views formulated while a private citizen involved with public
issues. With an "aggressive introvert" personality, his instinct for unob-
trusive control was sharpened by the machinations of international
business, finance, and politics. The "Chief" would certainly squirm,
stew, and erupt at portions of this book, but it is a model of critical and
sympathetic biography.
Hoover's secretariat and presidency naturally elicit the greatest
interest, provoke the widest controversy, and clearly reflect the trend
toward less generous appraisals. Although each writer may adduce
specific reasons to reprove Hoover, they are part of a larger framework
in a sequence of perceptions. Restrained criticism of the initial revision-
ists was generally within the limits of new perceptions of the "Chief" as
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either an incipient New Dealer or exponent of "associative state"
voluntarism and cooperation, which allowed government guidance
with a modicum of coercion. Although these were not wholly compat-
ible views, both nullified the progressive caricature of a nineteenth
century laissez-faire, individualistic reactionary with an unabashed
business bias and veneration of competition. Hoover's resurrection to
respectability was perhaps based more on what he was not than what
he was. This favorable shift in perception, however, failed to cloak the
"Chief with immunity.
Hoover has been a vulnerable target in this decade, and it is tied in
part to the issue of the New Era as prologue to the New Deal. Whereas
initial revisionists often discerned strong continuity between the two,
later writers are prone to regard it as more tenuous. Although the
"Chiefs' critics readily admit that his philosophy and policies were not
of the antediluvian sort perceived by progressive historians, they often
echo the progressive critique when they assert that they may as well
have been when judged by the consequences.
Hoover's beliefs and programs, now largely equated with those of
the associative state, have been subjected to a review probably more
exacting and comprehensive than those of any other public figure.
Often short on generosity, many historians have dismissed his blue-
print and policies as inadequate to the realities of the 1920s and exigen-
cies of the Great Depression. Evidence that Hoover used new depar-
tures to sustain prosperity in the expansive 1920s and resorted to
unprecedented measures to generate economic recovery in the convul-
sions of the Great Depression satisfied many early revisionists, but
later writers have judged Hoover less by his vision and goals than by
their results.
Hoover's sagging reputation has partially turned on his limited
and tentative recourse to government intervention as secretary of com-
merce and president. That issue, however, is not solely responsible for
his limited eclipse. His political acumen, personality, administrative
style, and social convictions have often generated equal controversy,
and some have ignored no opportunity to emphasize his purported or
genuine weaknesses. Even those basically sympathetic toward Hoover
often discern less than admirable qualities that the initial revisionists
overlooked or of which they were unaware.
Still unexplained is where Hoover found the necessary energy
and mental concentration for his multifarious projects as secretary of
commerce. Between 1921 and 1928 he gave full rein to his associative
state reform impulses that ranged from the attempted rescue of strug-
gling industries to improving the health care afforded children. Virtu-
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ally without exception, historical writing since 1980 approves of
Hoover's ideals and objectives.
Yet conclusions in the same writing by and large contradict the
earlier favorable revisionist assessment that contributed to the
'Chief's" resurrection. Not transfixed by his secretariat record, later
writers emphasize its shortcomings. They would claim that his liabili-
ties as president reflect those as secretary and were predictable. Im-
pressions of Hoover in the two offices are actually almost inverted in
the writing after 1980 in the sense that he is presented as more willing
as chief executive to modify stifling principles than while running his
secretariat. A consequence of the downgrading of Hoover as secretary
is by comparison to raise his evaluation as president, which is defi-
nitely faint consolation.
Typical praise is bestowed on Hoover's perspicacity and goals in
William J. Barber, From New Era to New Deal: Herbert Hoover, the Econ-
omists, and American Economic Policy, 1921-1933 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1985). No person was more convinced
of the validity and more influential and assiduous in the promotion
of New Era propositions like high wages than Hoover. Committed to
a rational, productive, and humane economy, he was as aware of the
keys to national income and employment as anyone in his generation
and as willing to use government in pursuit of prosperity. Barber's
broad and coherent context is helpful in defining the roles of specific
policies in Hoover's macroeconomic scheme. Not all of Barber's con-
tent is new, but it is readable and instructive economic history that co-
gently argues that Hoover's views were profoundly advanced when
compared with contemporaries.
A collection of uniformly impressive essays, first presented at the
Herbert Hoover Centennial Seminars, is contained in Ellis W. Hawley,
ed., Herbert Hoover as Secretary of Commerce: Studies in New Era
Thought and Practice (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1981). The
Hoover secretariat is also the subject of essays in Carl E. Krog and
William R. Tanner, eds., Herbert Hoover and the Republican Era: A Re-
consideration (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984). A
composite Hoover is not easily assembled from the disparate topics
and perspectives in these anthologies, but they basically portray an ac-
tivist and rational manager with an associative state reform blueprint
compounded of realism and idealism. Although the Hoover reform
view was never starkly economic, nearly all the essays in these anthol-
ogies deal with his economic policies and theories. Generally described
in the essays is not the archetypal reactionary of progressive animus,
but a secretary committed to the welfare of fanners and workers, inter-
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ested in industrial democracy, and responsible for the precedent of a
managed peacetime economy.
Unfortunately for Hoover's reputation, the essays are nearly
unanimous in the appraisal that his programs were failures, including
his "War on Waste," efforts at industrial democracy, and the early 1920s
economic recovery measures. Varied and complex reasons are offered
for the abundant failures aniassed by Hoover. Some find the fault in
inherently invalid assumptions upon which the associative state was
based, which would have prevented its realization irrespective of the
limitations of its principle architect. The "Chief," however, is not al-
lowed to escape criticism that easily. A preponderance of writers are
also prone to emphasize Hoover's own contradictory, fuzzy, and in-
consistent perceptions, flawed personality, and political ineptness as
decisive for or contributing to his failures. The principled idealist with
a humane and visionary outline of the associative state is often in
graphic relief with the dogn\atic and blundering practitioner.
Revitalization of ailing industries and impetus to new ones along
associative state lines has been a popular topic since 1980, but one
largely expounded in journals. Hoover's policies are pronounced as
failures nearly without exception, but success is discerned in Philip T.
Rosen, The Modern Stentors: Radio Broadcasters and the Federal Govern-
ment, 1920-1934: (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980). This well-
written, extensively researched, and nicely synthesized book informs
readers that Hoover was only one of the many principals in mercurial,
early broadcast history, and that adoption of his particular views of pri-
vate ownership, industry practices, and government regulation were
anything but inevitable. The fact that nearly all aspects of radio broad-
casting had the "Chiefs' imprint attests to his aggressive bureaucratic
acumen and infinite tenacity.
HOOVER'S LOWER STOCK as secretary of commerce is a preview to
that as president. Few of the complimentary earlier revisionist versions
are left unchallenged, and the Hoover evinced since 1980 is often a
markedly less likable and more hapless figure. Not since the apex of
the progressive interpretation has some of the writing been as devas-
tating. Journals have been particularly scathing forums, and articles
abound with testimony on his personal, political, and ideological defi-
ciencies. The writing, however, should not be construed as a simple re-
version to the progressive interpretation. Whereas progressive histori-
ans often employed greater portions of emotion and ideology than
reason and evidence, writers since 1980 often make their case with
convincing evidence and astute analysis.
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Writing of the post-1980 variety is also likely to give Hoover
credit for unprecedented anticyclical measures. An interesting phe-
nomenon is that when differences narrow they also loom larger be-
tween the New Era and New Deal. .Hoover transcended or sacrificed
important aspects of the associative state vision that he regarded as
nearly inviolate in the 1920s to combat the depression and generate
economic recovery, but he could not and would not adopt unrestrained
New Deal intervention. The halting and gloomy reluctance with which
Hoover adopted policies that skewed or openly violated his economic
tenets only accentuates differences between the tentative "Chief" and
uninhibited New Dealers. Not unexpected, however, is that much re-
cent writing on the presidency attaches greater importance than once
was given to Hoover's political and personal deficiencies. Strongly in-
ferred in a portion of the writing is that Hoover's political ineptitude,
defective personality, and, one could add, bad luck were of such a mag-
nitude that not even expansive New Dealism could have saved the oc-
cupant of the White House.
Many of these propositions are presented in a restrained and not
unsympathetic way by Martin L. Fausold, The Presidency of Herbert
Hoover (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985). This astute sur-
vey has an instructive introduction that explains the various influ-
ences on Hoover's views and personality, and is particularly interest-
ing on his transition from sectarian to secular Quakerism. Committed
to reform, including a "new social system," Hoover's political passiv-
ity and ineptitude and inability to shape and inspire public opinion
were apparent even before his administration was shaken by the
stock market crash and ensuing depression. Hoover responded to the
crisis in an unprecedented manner, although his actions were often
concealed or poorly explained, obscured by optimistic statements,
and distorted by critics who were often more myopic than the subject
of their denigration.
Although Hoover was a victim of base partisanship, personal
vindictiveness, and public misunderstanding, he often did little to help
his situation and often made it worse by always looking at the "dark
side first." Hoover was an unfortunate captive of his own personality
and political principles, and he was probably even more dogmatic in
clinging to dubious beliefs like non-partisanship than to his economic
views. Although never an advocate of unconditional government in-
tervention, Hoover's economic policies moved a great distance be-
tween 1929 and 1932. Yet Hoover's too little, too late departures did
not prevent the economy from sinking to its nadir.
Hoover's liabilities had fewer international than domestic reper-
cussions, and Fausold is generous in his foreign-policy appraisal. Rec-
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ognizing Hoover as the pivotal policymaker in his administration, the
author assigns high marks for his restraint and sound judgment in pur-
suing American interests in a way that was compatible with a large part
of the globe. Notwithstanding compliments on foreign policy and
credit for domestic reform and economic recovery efforts, Fausold con-
cludes that the negative assessment of Hoover is both valid and un-
likely to change. A large part of the post-1980 writing parallels
Fausold's analysis and concurs with his evaluation.
A substantial part of Fausold's book is retold by Barber, in From
New Era to New Deal, which is not less instructive simply because it is
no longer seismic news that Hoover's anticyclical activism during the
Great Depression violated his associative state postulates. Hoover sub-
scribed to the Keynesian axiom that aggregate volume of spending de-
termines macroeconomic system behavior. Although Hoover is often
criticized for dogmatic inflexibility, his views were fluid and that axiom
is one of the few constants that explain his economic policies.
The "Chief" receives his due in Barber's book, which analyzes his
fluid views and responses to the economic disaster. Often off the mark,
along with many economists. Hoover nevertheless moved almost in-
evitably in retrospect to broaden government responsibility and inter-
vention. Even persons generally conversant with Hoover's policies
may discover edifying information, like his effort, too successful for his
later reputation, to obscure his "dramatic departures." The "Chief's"
failure was due not to economic illiteracy, as that phrase is commonly
understood, but to his inhibitions about the role of government.
Hoover's unprecedented but circumscribed use of government re-
sulted in "striking discontinuities" and "arresting continuities" between
the New Era and New Deal.
Barber's estimate of Hoover is higher than that of many post-
1980 writers, whose interest is largely in political and social aspects
of his administration. Essays in Krog and Tanner, Herbert Hoover and
the Republican Era, for example, often portray a politically maladroit
and intractable president whose principles and dogmatism were
stronger than sound judgment and compassion. A shift in emphasis
is also discernible in later writing, and racial minorities have ob-
tained virtual parity with destitute Americans as principal victims of
Hoover's policies.
This is the thesis of many articles and the well-written and thor-
oughly researched book on the conundrum of race by Donald J. Lisio,
Hoover, Blacks, and Lily-Whites: A Study of Southern Strategies (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985). Anything but a
Hooverphobe, Lisio nevertheless concludes that the "Chief's" policies
toward blacks were disastrous. Hoover had enlightened racial atti-
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tudes for his generation, but few of his high principles and policies
went more seriously awry than those on race. His plan to end black
subjugation through tenancy and peonage fizzled, and his strategy to
benefit blacks through patronage reform that would lead to a two-
party South was dubiously conceived and ineptly executed.
Unwillingness to disclose the black gains envisaged in the
strategy and egregious political bungling led to the widespread and
mistaken belief that Hoover had a lily-white southern strategy and
was hostile to black rights and aspirations. Lisio describes a steady
and pathetic deterioration of relations between Hoover and blacks,
and a widening gulf between principles and practices. Hoover's
losses as a consequence were largely self-inflicted. Although 'more
an unwitting victim of racism and of his own peculiar failings as a
political leader than he was an enemy of black people," Hoover's
'venture into southern politics proved a sad encounter both for him
and black Americans."
AMPLY COMPENSATING for past inattention to the third of
Hoover's life after the White House are the two works: Gary Dean Best,
Herbert Hoover, The Postpresidential Years, 1933-1964,2 vols. (Stanford:
Hoover Institution Press, 1983); and Richard Norton Smith, An Un-
common Man: The Triumph of Herbert Hoover (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1984). Parallels are stronger than dissimilarities between the
authors, and they dispel any notions that Hoover faded into obscurity,
abandoned politics, or drastically altered his mind on any important
issue. Best posits that the 'Chief's" later career alone was influential
enough to make an imprint on history, and neither he nor Smith leave
many grounds for dispute.
Hoover lived with slander, spite, and public approbrium after
1933, and was a pariah even within his party, which twice denied him
renomination. Not one to suffer rejection with equaninüty, he often
answered his tormentors in a petty and vindictive spirit. Will power,
political adroitness, longevity that surpassed enemies, public forget-
fulness, and conciliatory gestures, for example, by Harry S Truman en-
abled Hoover to regain respect, influence, and a sense of proportion.
Progressive by earlier standards. Hoover was conservative by
later ones—if the last appellation is not distorted. Without renouncing
welfare capitalism, he balked at intrusive government, and his foreign
policy views were a blend of isolationism and internationalism. When
Hoover's age and health curtailed his public activity, he became even
more compulsive about writing. Prolific if not riveting, his writing was
strongly didactic, reflected his particular vision, and expressed his per-
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sonal version of the past. Hoover despaired about America, but he died
at the age of ninety with his faith preserved.
Best has written excellent political biography that does not devi-
ate long or far from the subject; Hoover's myriad interests and prodi-
gious activities are left largely unexplored. Interesting and perceptive
vignettes in the Smith biography are an instructive supplement to the
Best narrative. Competing viewpoints are often omitted or summarily
dismissed in the Best volumes, with the consequence that they can
read like a Hoover monologue. Best is convincing that the "Chief
would be an ideal fishing companion, except for the one-sided conver-
sation. Although deferential toward his subject. Smith is less hesitant
to impute frailty and error to Hoover.
T H E FAVORABLE INITIAL REVISIONIST PORTRAYAL of Hoover
that gained many adherents has been qualified in the writing since
1980. It is important to note, however, that later writing does not
amount to a categorical scuttling of earlier revisionism and
reinstitution of the progressive interpretation. Writing in this decade,
in fact, contains many affirmations of earlier revisionism, and many of
the differences reflect a logical progression in historical interpretation.
Whatever the criticisms and failures of Hoover, they are not of a
nineteenth-century reactionary; they are of an early twentieth-century
progressive whose philosophical bridge between the past and future
was buckled by the weight it had to carry. Although historians have re-
cently emphasized the "Chief's" political, personality, and doctrinal
limitations, the initial revisionist view of an able and activist reform-
minded secretary of commerce and president is dented but intact.
Martin L. Fausold concluded in his perceptive book on the
Hoover presidency that the negative evaluation of the "Chief" was un-
likely ever to change. Progressive historians, of course, subscribed to
the same proposition. Prediction is perilous business, but it seems safe
to suggest that Hoover may well be a subject of nearly infinite revision.
This is both because many varieties of historians write in habitually
changing contexts and because Hoover, as illustrated in the famous
"Ding" Darling cartoon, was a man for all interpretations.
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